The foundations of scientific inference

@inproceedings{Salmon1967TheFO,
  title={The foundations of scientific inference},
  author={Wesley Salmon},
  year={1967},
  url={https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:122801610}
}
Not since Ernest Nagel s 1939 monograph on the theory of probability has there been a comprehensive elementary survey of the philosophical problems of probablity and induction. This is an authoritative and up-to-date treatment of the subject, and yet it is relatively brief and nontechnical.Hume s skeptical arguments regarding the justification of induction are taken as a point of departure, and a variety of traditional and contemporary ways of dealing with this problem are considered. The… 
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