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Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement

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Armenia–Azerbaijan peace deal
On the Establishment of Peace and Interstate Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan
Left to right: President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan, US president Donald Trump, and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of Armenia signing a trilateral joint declaration
Signed8 August 2025 (2025-08-08) (initialed)
LocationWhite House, Washington, DC, United States
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The Armenia–Azerbaijan peace deal,[a] officially titled the Agreement "On the Establishment of Peace and Interstate Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan",[b][1] aims to end the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. On 8 August 2025, Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev, with the mediation of United States president Donald Trump, initialed an agreement and signed a joint declaration emphasizing the need to continue efforts toward the signing and final ratification of the agreement.

One concession made by Armenia is the withdrawal of Russian defensive forces from the Armenia-Azerbaijani border.[2]

Another key part of the agreement is the construction of a route (described as the "Zangezur corridor" by Turkish and Azerbaijani sources) linking mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, which is separated by a 32 km (20 mi) stretch of Armenian territory. The route will remain a part of Armenian territory and be operated according to Armenian law, but the United States will have exclusive rights to develop the area for 99 years.[3] Because of US president Donald Trump's role in brokering the agreement, the route has been named the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). Currently, due to the ongoing Turkish–Azeri blockade against Armenia, direct transit through the region is hampered.[4] In addition to the immediate goal, the completion of the route would allow the passage of people and goods from Europe to Azerbaijan and the broader Central Asia without needing to travel through Russia or Iran. Iran and Russia have condemned the role of the United States in the proposed TRIPP project as an encroachment.[5][6]

Observers in Iran, Russia, have condemned the corridor as U.S. encroachment. Armenian observers in have condemned the peace deal as a legitimization of Azerbaijan's aggression and expansionist ambitions against Armenians in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.

Background

Main article: Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict began in 1988 when ethnic Armenians demanded the transfer of the NKAO region to Armenia. As the war progressed, Armenia and Azerbaijan, then both former Soviet Republics, entangled themselves in a protracted, undeclared war in the mountainous heights of Karabakh as Azerbaijan attempted to curb the secessionist movement in Nagorno-Karabakh. On 20 February 1988, the enclave's parliament voted in favour of uniting with Armenia. As the Soviet Union's dissolution neared, the tensions gradually grew into an increasingly violent conflict between ethnic Armenians and ethnic Azerbaijanis. Both sides made claims of ethnic cleansing and pogroms conducted by the other.[7]

As Azerbaijan declared its independence from the Soviet Union and removed the powers held by the enclave's government, the Armenian majority voted to secede from Azerbaijan. The referendum held in 1991 was boycotted by the Azerbaijani population and had an electorate turnout of 82.1%, of which 99.9% voted in favour of independence. The referendum resulted in the unrecognized Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Full-scale fighting erupted in the late winter of 1992. International mediation by several groups, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), failed to bring resolution. In the spring of 1993, Armenian forces captured territory outside the enclave itself, threatening to catalyze the involvement of other countries in the region. By the end of the war in 1994, the Armenians were in full control of most of the enclave and also held and currently control approximately 9% of Azerbaijan's territory outside the enclave. An estimated 353,000 Armenians from Azerbaijan and 500,000 Azerbaijanis from Armenia and Karabakh were displaced as a result of the conflict. A Russian-brokered ceasefire was signed in May 1994, leading to diplomatic mediation.[7]

Border clashes continued in the following years, eventually escalating to the 2008 Mardakert clashes, which began on 4 March after the 2008 Armenian election protests, resulting in several score wounded and killed, with both sides declaring victory.[8][9] It was the heaviest fighting between ethnic Armenian and Azerbaijani forces since the 1994 ceasefire after the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. Following the incident, on 14 March the United Nations General Assembly by a recorded vote of 39 in favour to 7 against adopted Resolution 62/243, demanding the immediate withdrawal of all Armenian forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. The 2010 Nagorno-Karabakh clash was a scattered exchange of gunfire that took place on 18 February on the line of contact dividing Azerbaijani and the Karabakh Armenian military forces. As a result, three Azerbaijani soldiers were killed and one wounded. The 2010 Mardakert clashes were the deadliest for Armenian forces since the 2008 violence. Between 2008 and 2010, 74 soldiers were killed on both sides.[10]

A four-day escalation in April 2016 resulted in hundreds of casualties but only minor changes to the front line. In late 2020, the large-scale Second Nagorno-Karabakh War resulted in thousands of casualties and a significant Azerbaijani victory. An armistice was established by a tripartite ceasefire agreement on 10 November, resulting in Azerbaijan regaining all of the occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh as well as capturing one-third of Nagorno-Karabakh itself. Ceasefire violations in Nagorno-Karabakh and on the Armenian–Azerbaijani border continued following the 2020 war.[11]

Azerbaijan regained control over the disputed territory and surrounding regions in 2020 and 2023.[12][13][14]

In October 2022, the European Union announced a civilian mission to Armenia to assist with border delimitation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This mission aimed to support peaceful negotiations, provide technical help in marking the borders, and promote stability in the region amid renewed tensions.[15]

On 13 March 2025, it was announced that both parties had agreed on all terms of the peace agreement.[16] The announcement was described as "historic" by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, while European Union High Representative Kaja Kallas referred to it as "a decisive step."[17]

According to political analyst Thomas de Waal, the progress towards the agreement is largely attributed to Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan, who has made a series of concessions in an effort to reach a deal. De Waal also noted that Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev rarely emphasizes the benefits of peace, and continues to use the conflict with Armenia as a means to consolidate his leadership within the country.[17]

Geopolitical significance

South Caucasus Pipeline for natural gas, connecting Azerbaijan and Turkey

The strategic transit route between Armenia and Azerbaijan is planned to be named the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, or TRIPP, and the development rights to the project are guaranteed to the United States for 99 years.[18] Under the agreement, the US would sublease the land to a consortium that will develop rail, oil, gas, and fiber optic lines, as well as possibly electricity transmission, along the 43-kilometre (27 mi) route.[19][20]

The deal reduces Russian influence in the South Caucasus, as Armenia has shifted toward Western partnerships following Azerbaijan's 2023 military recapture of Nagorno-Karabakh.[21] It strengthens US economic and strategic ties in the region while sidelining the OSCE Minsk Group (a Russia-led mediation body now deemed obsolete).[22] With it, the US replaces Russia as the main mediator in the region.[23]

A US official told Axios that the main goal of the United States in this development project is to reduce the influence of Iran, Russia, and China in the South Caucasus region. The route would allow people and goods to travel between Turkey and Azerbaijan and beyond to Central Asia without passing through Iran or Russia.[24]

According to US Senator Steve Daines, the deal will allow energy and mineral exports from the region, bypassing Russia and China.[25][26][14]

In the meantime, Iran threatened to block the planned route, citing security concerns, despite earlier welcoming the broader peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.[27]

Reactions

Iran and Russia have condemned the role of the United States in the proposed Zangezur corridor as an encroachment.[5][6] Observers have also criticized the peace deal for not addressing the right of return for former ethnic Armenians who fled from Nagorno-Karabakh as a result of Azerbaijan's 9-month-long military siege and offensive.[28][29][30][31] Aram Hamparian, executive director of the Armenian National Committee of America, stated that "normalizing ethnic cleansing is not peace" and considered the agreement to be predicated on the erasure of Nagorno-Karabakh, the abandonment of holy sites, the neglect of hostages, and the entrenchment of Azerbaijani occupation.[32]

Armenian sources have also criticized the peace agreement for not addressing Azerbaijan's expansionist project of "Western Azerbaijan" which claims all of Armenia.[2]

References

Notes

  1. ^ Armenian: Հայաստանի և Ադրբեջանի միջև խաղաղության համաձայնագիր, romanized: Hayastani yev Adrbejani mijev khaghaghut'yan hamadzaynagir; Azerbaijani: Azərbaycan–Ermənistan sülh müqaviləsi
  2. ^ Armenian: Հայաստանի Հանրապետության և Ադրբեջանի Հանրապետության միջև խաղաղության և միջպետական հարաբերությունների հաստատման մասին համաձայնագիր, romanized: Hayastani Hanrapetut'yan yev Adrbejani Hanrapetut'yan mijev khaghaghut'yan yev mijpetakan haraberutyunneri hastatman masin hamadzaynagir; Azerbaijani: Azərbaycan Respublikası və Ermənistan Respublikası arasında sülhün və dövlətlərarası münasibətlərin təsis

Citations

  1. ^ "Publication of the initialed Agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan". Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Armenia). Retrieved 30 August 2025.
  2. ^ a b Martirosyan, Armine (23 April 2025). "'Baku rewrites history and threatens Armenia' - on 'Western Azerbaijan' narrative". Jamnews in English. Retrieved 3 November 2025.
  3. ^ Holland, Steve (7 August 2025). "U.S. secures strategic transit corridor in Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal". Reuters. Retrieved 4 October 2025.
  4. ^ Raufoglu, Alex. "From Conflict to Commerce: 'Trump Route' to Link Azerbaijan, Armenia in New Peace Deal". www.kyivpost.com. Archived from the original on 21 August 2025. Retrieved 4 October 2025.
  5. ^ a b "Moscow and Tehran Working to Block U.S. Involvement in Zangezur Corridor". Archived from the original on 8 August 2025. Retrieved 21 August 2025.
  6. ^ a b Mirovalev, Mansur. "Does a Trump-brokered deal squeeze Russia, Iran out of the South Caucasus?". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 18 August 2025. Retrieved 21 August 2025.
  7. ^ a b De Waal, Thomas (2004). Black garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through peace and war (1st publ. in paperback ed.). New York: New York Univ. Press. ISBN 978-0-8147-1945-9.
  8. ^ "Fatal Armenian-Azeri border clash". 5 March 2008. Archived from the original on 5 March 2008. Retrieved 28 August 2025.
  9. ^ "Karabakh casualty toll disputed". 5 March 2008. Archived from the original on 9 March 2008. Retrieved 28 August 2025.
  10. ^ Armenia and Azerbaijan: Preventing War (PDF). Crisis Group Europe Briefing No. 60 (Report). Tbilisi/Baku/Yerevan/Istanbul/Brussels: International Crisis Group. 18 February 2011. Archived (PDF) from the original on 7 July 2024. Retrieved 29 August 2025.
  11. ^ "Armenia and Azerbaijan: A blockade that never ended and a peace deal hanging by a thread". Global Voices. 19 July 2023. Archived from the original on 27 July 2023. Retrieved 28 August 2025.
  12. ^ "Doc. 7182: Report on the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh". Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 17 October 1994. Archived from the original on 25 April 2025. Retrieved 15 August 2025.
  13. ^ "Armenia and Azerbaijan: A blockade that never ended and a peace deal hanging by a thread". Global Voices. 19 July 2023. Archived from the original on 27 July 2023. Retrieved 24 July 2023.
  14. ^ a b "Azerbaijan and Armenia sign peace agreement after decades of conflict". euronews. 8 August 2025. Retrieved 9 August 2025.
  15. ^ "EU to send 'civilian mission' to Armenia to help mark borders with Azerbaijan". France 24. 7 October 2022. Archived from the original on 9 August 2025. Retrieved 9 August 2025.
  16. ^ Light, Felix; Bagirova, Nailia (14 March 2025). "Armenia and Azerbaijan agree treaty terms to end almost 40 years of conflict". Reuters. Retrieved 21 March 2025.
  17. ^ a b "Armenia and Azerbaijan's Major Step Forward". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 17 March 2025. Retrieved 21 March 2025.
  18. ^ "Azerbaijan and Armenia sign peace deal at White House that creates a 'Trump Route' in region". The Guardian. 9 August 2025. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 15 September 2025.
  19. ^ Schwartz, Felicia; Bazail-Eimil, Eric (7 August 2025). "US brokers a deal between long-hostile Armenia and Azerbaijan". Politico. Retrieved 11 August 2025.
  20. ^ "Announcement on White House website: President Trump Brokers Another Historic Peace Deal". The White House. 8 August 2025.
  21. ^ "Armenia's pivot to West with 'Trump Corridor' deal sidelines Russia". Financial Times. 8 August 2025. Retrieved 9 August 2025.
  22. ^ "How the 'Trump Corridor' deal reshapes South Caucasus geopolitics". Al Jazeera. 8 August 2025. Retrieved 9 August 2025.
  23. ^ "Что изменит проект TRIPP для Армении и Южного Кавказа – DW – 09.08.2025". Deutsche Welle.
  24. ^ "Trump to oversee Armenia-Azerbaijan peace accord on Friday". Axios. 7 August 2025.
  25. ^ "US Senator: Armenia-Azerbaijan agreement will provide oil, natural gas supplies bypassing Russia, China". news.am. 4 October 2025. Retrieved 4 October 2025.
  26. ^ "Trump brokers potentially game-changing deal with Armenia, Azerbaijan". eurasianet.org. 8 August 2025.
  27. ^ Hafezi, Parisa; Osborn, Andrew (9 August 2025). "Iran threatens planned Trump corridor envisaged by Azerbaijan–Armenia peace deal". Reuters.
  28. ^ "Armenians deserve more than a transactional peace deal with Azerbaijan". Los Angeles Times. 21 August 2025. Retrieved 18 September 2025. But this deal is far from complete. It omits the right of return for displaced Armenians to Artsakh, ignores the destruction of Armenians' towns, homes and businesses, makes no commitment to preserve Artsakh's cultural heritage and says nothing about prisoners of war. For many in the Armenian diaspora, these are glaring and unacceptable omissions.
  29. ^ "Armenia and Azerbaijan Agree on Next Steps at White House Summit". The Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved 18 September 2025. The opposition also criticized Pashinyan for not mentioning Armenian prisoners in Baku and the potential return of ethnic Armenians from Karabakh, who left the formerly separatist region in September 2023.
  30. ^ Brivati, Brian (11 August 2025). "Will Trump's deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan lead to lasting peace?". The Conversation. Retrieved 18 September 2025. Despite the celebratory signing, the peace deal faces significant hurdles. The agreement sidesteps the plight of Armenian prisoners of war and detainees still held in Azerbaijan. It also ignores the right of return for over 110,000 Armenian civilians who were forcefully expelled from Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian opposition and diaspora groups have criticised the accord for "sidelining justice".
  31. ^ Goldstein, Thomas. "Unpacking Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace: Infrastructure Connectivity at the Center of US Diplomacy". Steptoe. Retrieved 18 September 2025. Notably, the agreement did not touch upon the governance of Nagorno-Karabakh or the right of return for ethnic Armenians displaced by Azerbaijan's takeover.
  32. ^ Tharoor, Ishaan (8 August 2025). "Before Gaza's woe, there was Nagorno-Karabakh". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 27 August 2025. Retrieved 21 August 2025.
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